Interesting thread âŚ. which I seem to have missed.
My take, which Iâm not necessarily suggesting suits anybody else, is to consider security and home automation as not necessarily linked.
For me, home automation is about our convenience. And nowt else. Part of that is what data I am prepared to let leak to the likes of Amazon (not too much) or Google (absolutely nothing if I can prevent it without massive inconvenience). So, I have a few Echo devices and some smart bulbs that let me turn lights on/off or dim, by voice (or switch/sensor, as well, in a couple of cases), and play internet radio. Not much else, and no way am I connecting cameras to that.
Security is a different issue (for me) and I approach that with two different philosophies. Those are âobviousâ and ânon-obviousâ. Non-obvious involves some physical measures that are going to make getting in non-trivial. The obvious category is things that anyone walking/driving past might see, like alarm boxes, cameras or gates, walls, etc.
The other factor is to consider who are are seeking to protect from. The meaures I would take against the casual local neâer-do-well opportunistic a-hole are very different from what might work against a professional. For the latter, well, unless youâre setting up Fort Knox, the White House or Buckingham Palace (and at least two of those have had well-publicised breaches) itâs a case of not keeping out really serious burglars unless youâre spending mega-money.
All you can do is either make it hard enough that hopefully they target someone else, or minimise the risk profile by not having anything to target that would make it worth their while in the first place. Or, potentially, by being crafty enough to appear to not have nothing worth their effort, and hiding it really cleverly if they try anyway.
But be aware, there is (in my opinion) a very bad middle ground. Iâd advise against taking suffiiently expensive preventative measures to keep the casual local idiots out, by going far enough to hang out a sign to the serious burglars saying âsomething here worth nickingâ.
So âŚ. take all obvious basic steps - decent doors/windows, donât leave ground floor doors unlocked and secure windows etc if you go out, chain any ladders etc down, or better yet, donât leave anything like that laying around in the first place. Thatâs a set of examples, not a comprehensive list. Oh, and basic alarm boxes etc might deter the casual thief but too good a system risks advertising yourself to a more serious class of scumbag.
You might even want to consider the alarm box you appear to have not being the one you actually do. Oh, and hard-wired is better, IMHO, than wifi for security functions. Other measures might include anti-climb paint, nasty bushes (with nasty needles ;) ) along fence lines to deter people climbing over, etc. Oh, and be aware of what you can do legally, and what you canât - broken glass on the tops of walls for fences isnât a bright idea, but a few bushes with loads of 2âł thorns or needles âŚ. <grin>.
Less obvious? Think about how you might get in if you had to break in? Where are the less secure points? Garage door is often one. You can also consider re-inforced door frames, and wood-clad steel-cored doors, etc. These arenât that cheap, and even less so as a retrofit, but if done well, will be invisible from the outside. Good luck to anyone trying to kick my doors in âŚ. when they get out of the foot/ankle plaster. ;)
That kind of measure is effective against casuals, without screaming âsomething to protectâ to professionals.
Another factor, and itâs a major one âŚ. the size, type and location of where you live. Living in a Beverly Hills mansion is going to present a different risk profile to a council house in Stoke on Trent, Deptford or well, anywhere really. That will be part of assessing who you are protecting against.
Finally, consider exactly what you are protecting, what it is worth, and what both the cost and inconvenience factors of serious security are against the value of what youâre protecting, and/or where a more sensible approach is either to not hve extremely valuable items in the first place, or to ensure you insure them thoroughly.
One reason I donât have an extensive collection of Monetâs and Van Goghâs is I canât protect them. So itâs convenient I also canât afford them. I can afford nice watches, jewelry, etc but chose not to have them, partly for security reasons. Also because while I like watches, I donât like them enough to pay what a collection would cost. And the one I do have âŚ. insured.
I donât want to live in a secure bunker, partly because of the inconvenience. I also donât want the worry of loads of expensive and highly portable stuff. Sure, some stuff is expensive (though not in Picasso territory, or anything close) but some camera gear, computer gear etc is worth a fair bit. So, I have good insurance and if the worst happens, it can all be easily replaced.
I take reasonable steps to deter casual riff-raff, plus some ânon-obviousâ measures, but donât have anything likely to attract serious professionals, and not much to attract even less serious ones âŚ. that isnât insured thoroughly.
We each have to calibrate our response to security according to our circumstances, what weâre trying to protect, who weâre protecting against and how much cost and inconvience taking more measure would involve, and whether itâs worth it or not. It is easy to get carried away with what you can do rather than what really makes sense to do, and to omit considering that more heavyweight measures might actually have a downside, in marking you as a target.
All IMHO, and YMMV.